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Abstract
We propose a new detection algorithm that uses structural
relationships between senders and recipients of email as
the basis for the identification of spam messages. Users
and receivers are represented as vectors in their reciprocal
spaces. A measure of similarity between vectors is con-
structed and used to group users into clusters. Knowledge
of their classification as past senders/receivers of spam or
legitimate mail, comming from an auxiliary detection al-
gorithm, is then used to label these clusters probabilisti-
cally. This knowledge comes from an auxiliary algorithm.
The measure of similarity between the sender and receiver
sets of a new message to the center vector of clusters is
then used to asses the possibility of that message being le-
gitimate or spam. We show that the proposed algorithm is
able to correct part of the false positives (legitimate mes-
sages classified as spam) using a testbed of one week smtp
log.
1 Introduction
The relentless rise in spam email traffic, now accounting
for about 83% of all incoming messages, up from 24% in
January 2003 [13], is becoming one of the greatest threats
to the use of email as a form of communication.
The greatest problem in detecting spam stems from
active adversarial efforts to thwart classification. Spam
∗Luiz H. Gomes is supported by Banco Central do Brasil.
senders use a multitude of techniques based on knowl-
edge of current detection algorithms, to evade detection.
These techniques range from changes in the way text is
written - so that it can not be directly analyzed computa-
tionally, but can be understood by humans naturally - to
frequent changes in other elements, such as user names,
domains, subjects, etc. Therefore, good choices for spam
identifiers are becoming increasingly more difficult.
In the light of this enormous variability the question
then is: what are the identifiers of spam that are most
costly to change, from the point of view of the sender?
The limitations of attempts to recognize spam by analyz-
ing content are clear [6]. Content-based techniques[16,
21, 17] have to cope with the constant changes in the way
spammers generate their solicitations. The structure of
the target space for these solicitations tends however to be
much more stable since spams senders still need to reach
recipients, even if under forged identifiers, in order to be
effective. Specifically by structure we mean the space of
recipients targeted by a spam sender, as well as the space
of senders that target a given recipient, i.e. the contacts
of a user. The contact lists, or subsets thereof, can then
be thought of as a signature of spam senders and recipi-
ents. Additionally by constructing a similarity measure in
these spaces we can track how lists evolve over time, by
addition or removal of addresses.
In this paper, we propose an algorithm for spam de-
tection that uses structural relationships between senders
and recipients as the basis for the identification of spam
messages. The algorithm must work in conjunction with
another spam classifier, necessary to produce spam or le-
gitimate mail tags on past senders and receivers, which in
turn are used to infer new ones through structural similar-
ity (hereafter called: auxiliary algorithm), The key idea
is that the lists spammers and legitimate users send mes-
sages to, as well as the lists from which they receive mes-
sages from can be used as the identifiers of classes of
email traffic [19, 10]. We will show that the final result
of the application of our structural algorithm over the de-
terminations of the initial classifier leads to the correction
of a number of misclassifications as false positives.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents
the methodology used to handle email data. Our struc-
tural algorithm is described in Section 3. We present the
characteristics of our example workload in section 4, as
well as the classification results obtained with our algo-
rithm over this set. Related work is presented in Section 5
and conclusions and future work in Section 6.
2 Modeling Similarity Among
Email Senders and Recipients
Our proposed spam detection algorithm exploits the struc-
tural similarities that exist in groups of senders and recip-
ients as well as in the relationship established through the
emails exchanged between them. This section introduces
our modeling of individual email users and a metric to ex-
press the similarity existent among different users. It then
extends the modeling to account for clusters of users who
have great similarity.
Our basic assumption is that, in both legitimate email
and spam traffics, users have a defined list of peers they
often have contact with (i.e., they send/receive an email
to/from). In legitimate email traffic, contact lists are con-
sequence of social relationships on which users’ commu-
nications are based. In spam traffic, on the other hand,
the lists used by spammers to distribute their solicitations
are created for business interest and, generally, do not re-
flect any form of social interaction. A user’s contact list
certainly may change over time. However, we expect it
to be much less variable than other characteristics com-
monly used for spam detection, such as sender user-name,
presence of certain keywords in the email content and en-
coding rules. In other words, we expect contact lists to
be more effective in identifying spams and, thus, we use
them as the basis for developing our algorithm.
We start by representing an email user as a vector in a
multi-dimensional conceptual space created with all pos-
sible contacts. We represent email senders and recipients
separately. We then use vectorial operations to express the
similarity among multiple senders (recipients), and use
this metric for clustering them. Note that the term email
user is used throughout this work to denote any identifi-
cation of an email sender/recipient (e.g., email address,
domain name, etc).
Let Nr be the number of distinct recipients. We repre-
sent sender si as a Nr dimensional vector, ~si, defined in
the conceptual space created by the email recipients being
considered. The n-th dimension (representing recipient
rn) of ~si is defined as:
~si[n] =
{
1, if si → rn
0, otherwise , (1)
where si → rn indicates that sender si has sent at least
one email to rn recipient.
Similarly, we define ~ri as a Ns dimensional vector rep-
resentation for the recipient ri, where Ns is the number
of distinct senders being considered. The n-th dimension
of this vector is set to 1 if recipient ri has received at least
one email from sn.
We next define the similarity between two senders si
and sj as the cosine of the angle between their vector rep-
resentation (~si and ~sj). The similarity is computed as fol-
lows:
sim(si, sj) =
~si ◦ ~sj
|~si||~sj | = cos(~si, ~sj), (2)
where ~si ◦ ~sj is the internal product of the vectors and
|~si| is the norm of ~si. Note that this metric varies from 0,
when senders do not share any recipient in their contact
lists, to 1, when senders have identical contact lists and
thus have the same representation. The similarity between
two recipients is defined similarly.
We note that our similarity metric has different inter-
pretations in legitimate and spam traffics. In legitimate
email traffic, it represents social interaction with the same
group of people, whereas in the spam traffic, a great sim-
ilarity represents the use of different identifiers by the
same spammer or the sharing of distribution lists by dis-
tinct spammers.
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Finally, we can use our vectorial modeling approach
to represent a cluster of users (senders or recipients) who
have great similarity. A sender cluster sci, represented
by vector ~sci, is computed as the vectorial sum of its ele-
ments, that is:
~sci =
∑
s∈sci
~s. (3)
The similarity between sender si and an existing cluster
scj can then be directly assessed by extending Equation 2
as follows:
sim(sci, si) =
{
cos( ~sci − ~si, ~si), if si ∈ sci
cos( ~sci, ~si), otherwise
(4)
We note that a sender si vectorial representation and thus
the sender cluster to which it belongs (i.e., shares the
greatest similarity) may change over time as new emails
are considered. Therefore, in order to accurately estimate
the similarity between a sender si and a sender cluster sci
to which si currently belongs, we first remove si from sci,
and then take the cossine between the two vectors ( ~sci−~si
and ~si). This is performed so that the previous classifica-
tion of a user does not influence its reclassification. Re-
cipient clusters and the similarity between a recipient and
a given recipient cluster are defined analogously.
3 A New Algorithm for Improving
Spam Detection
This section introduces our new email classification al-
gorithm which exploits the similarities between email
senders and between email recipients for clustering and
uses historical properties of clusters to improve spam de-
tection accuracy. Our algorithm is designed to work to-
gether with any existing spamdetection and filtering tech-
nique that runs at the ISP level. Our goal is to provide
a significant reduction of false positives (i.e., legitimate
emails wrongly classified as spam), which can be as high
as 15% in current filters [2].
A description of the proposed algorithm is shown in
Algorithm 1. It runs on each arriving email m, taking
as input the classification of m, mClass, as either spam
or legitimate email, performed by the existing auxiliary
spam detection method. Using the vectorial representa-
tion of email senders, recipients and clusters as well as
the similarity metric defined in Section 2, it then deter-
mines a new classification for m, which may or not agree
with mClass. The idea is that the classification by the
auxiliary method is used to build an incremental histori-
cal knowledge base that gets more representative through
time. Our algorithm benefits from that and outperforms
the auxiliary one as shown in Section 4.
for all arriving message m do
mClass =classification of m by auxiliary detection
method;
sc =find cluster for m.sender;
Update spam probability for sc using mClass;
Ps(m) =spam probability for sc;
Pr(m) = 0;
for all recipient r ∈ m.recipients do
rc =find cluster for r;
Update spam probability for rc using mClass;
Pr(m) = Pr(m)+spam probability for rc;
end for
Pr(m) = Pr(m)/size(m.recipients)
SP (m) = compute spam rank based on Ps(m) and
Pr(m);
if SP (m) > ω then
classify m as spam;
else if SP (m) < 1− ω then
classify m as legitimate;
else
classify m as mClass;
end if
end for
Algorithm 1: New Algorithm for Email Classification
In order to improve the accuracy of email classifica-
tion, our algorithm maintains sets of sender and recipient
clusters, created based on the structural similarity of dif-
ferent users. A sender (recipient) of an incoming email is
added to a sender (recipient) cluster that is most similar
to it, as defined in Equation (4), provided that their sim-
ilarity exceeds a given threshold τ . Thus, τ defines the
minimum similarity a sender (recipient) must have with a
cluster to be assigned to it. Varying τ allows us to create
more tightly or loosely knit clusters. If no cluster can be
found, a new single-user cluster is created. In this case,
the sender (recipient) is used as seed for populating the
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new cluster.
The sets of recipient and sender clusters are updated
at each new email arrival based on the email sender and
list of recipients. Recall that to determine the cluster a
previously observed, and thus clustered, user (sender or
recipient) belongs to, we first remove the user from his
current cluster and then assess its similarity to each ex-
isting cluster. Thus, single-user clusters tend to disappear
as more emails are processed, except for users that appear
only very sporadically.
Figure 1: Spam Rank Computation and Email Classifica-
tion.
A probability of sending (receiving) a spam is assigned
to each sender (recipient) cluster. We refer to this measure
as simply the cluster spam probability. We calculate the
spam probability of a sender (recipient) cluster as the av-
erage spam probability of its elements, which, in turn, is
estimated based on the frequency of spams sent/received
by each of them in the past. Therefore, our algorithm uses
the result of the email classification performed by the aux-
iliary algorithm on each arriving email m (mClass in Al-
gorithm 1) to continuously update cluster spam probabil-
ities.
Let us define the probability of an email m being sent
by a spammer, Ps(m), as the spam probability of its
sender’s cluster. Similarly, let the probability of an email
m being addressed to users that receive spam, Pr(m), as
the average spam probability of all of its recipients’ clus-
ters (see Algorithm 1). Our algorithm uses Ps(m) and
Pr(m) to compute a number that expresses the chance
of email m being spam. We call this number the spam
rank of email m, denoted by SR(m). The idea is that
emails with large values ofPs(m) and Pr(m) should have
large spam ranks and thus should be classified as spams.
Similarly, emails with small values of Ps(m) and Pr(m)
should receive low spam rank and be classified as legiti-
mate email.
Figure 1 shows a graphical representation of the com-
putation of an email spam rank. We first normalize the
probabilities Ps(m) and Pr(m) by a factor of
√
2, so
that the diagonal of the square region defined in the bi-
dimensional space is equal to 1 (see Figure 1-left). Each
email m can be represented as a point in this square. The
spam rank of m, SR(m), is then defined as the length of
the segment starting at the origin (0,0) and ending at the
projection of m on the diagonal of the square (see Fig-
ure 1-right). Note the spam rank varies between 0 and
1.
The spam rank SR(m) is then used to classify m as fol-
lows: if it is greater than a given threshold ω, the email is
classified as spam; if it is smaller than 1−ω, it is classified
as legitimate email. Otherwise, we can not precisely clas-
sify the email, and we rely on the initial classification pro-
vided by the auxiliary detection algorithm. The parameter
ω can be tuned to determine the precision that we expect
from our classification. Graphically, emails are classified
according to the marked regions shown in Figure 1-left.
The two triangles, with identical size and height ω, repre-
sent the regions where our algorithm is able to classify
emails as either spam (upper right) or legitimate email
(lower left).
4 Experimental Results
In this section we describe our experimental results. We
first present some important details of our workload, fol-
lowed by the quantitative results of our approach, com-
pared to others.
4.1 Workload
Our email workload consists of anonymized and sanitized
SMTP logs of incoming emails to a large university in
Brazil, with around 22 thousand students. The server
handles all emails coming from domains outside the uni-
versity, sent to students, faculty and staff with email ad-
dresses under the university’s domain name 1
1Only the emails addressed to two out of over 100 university sub-
domains (i.e., departments, research labs, research groups) do not pass
through the central server.
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The central email server runs Exim email software [9],
the Amavis virus scanner [1] and the Trendmicro Vscan
anti-virus tool [18]. A set of pre-acceptance spam filters
(e.g. black lists, DNS reversal) blocks about 50% of the
total traffic received by the server.
The messages not rejected by the pre-acceptance tests
are directed to Spam-Assassin [17]. Spam-Assassin is a
popular spam filtering software that detects spam mes-
sages based on a changing set of user-defined rules. These
rules assign scores to each email received based on the
presence in the subject or in the email body of one or more
pre-categorized keywords. Spam-Assassin also uses other
rules based on message size and encoding. Highly ranked
messages according to these criteria are flagged as spam.
We analyze an eight-day log collected between
01/19/2004 to 01/26/2004. Our logs store the header of
each email (i.e. containing sender, recipients, size , date,
etc.) that passes the pre-acceptance filters, along with the
results of the tests performed by Spam-Assassin and the
virus scanners. We also have the full body of the messages
that were classified as spam by Spam-Assassin. Table 1
summarizes our workload.
Measure Non-Spam Spam Aggregate
# of emails 191,417 173,584 365,001
Size of emails 11.3 GB 1.2 GB 12.5 GB
# of distinct senders 12,338 19,567 27,734
# of distinct recipients 22,762 27,926 38,875
Table 1: Summary of the Workload
By visually inspecting the list of sender user names 2
in the spam component of our workload, we found that a
large number of them corresponded to a seemingly ran-
dom sequence of characters, suggesting that spammers
tend to change user names as an evasion technique. There-
fore, for the experiments presented below we identified
the sender of a message by his/her domain while recipi-
ents were identified by their full address, including both
domain and user name.
4.2 Classification Results
The results shown in this section were obtained through
the simulation of the algorithm proposed here over the set
2The part before @ in email addresses.
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Figure 2: Number of Email User Clusters and Beta CV
vs. τ .
of messages in our logs. The implementation of the simu-
lator made use of an inverted lists [20] approach for stor-
ing information about senders, recipients and clusters that
is effective both in terms of memory and processing time.
Our simulations were executed on a commodity worksta-
tion (Intel Pentium R©4 - 2.80GHz - with 500MBytes) and
the simulator was able to classify 20 messages per sec-
ond. This is far faster than the average rate with which
messages usually arrive and than the peak rate observed
over the workload collection time [11].
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Figure 3: Number of Spam Messages by Varying Message
Spam Probabilities for Different Bin Sizes.
The number and quality of the clusters generated
through our similarity measure are the direct result of the
chosen value for the threshold τ (see Section 3). In order
to determine the best parameter value the simulation was
executed several times for varying τ .
Figure 2 shows how the number of clusters and beta
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CV 3 vary with τ . There is one clear point of stabilization
of the curve (i.e. a plateau) at τ = 0.5 and that is the
value we adopt for the remaining of the paper. Although
other stabilization points occur for values of τ above 0.5,
the lowest of such values seems to be the most appropriate
for our experiments. The reason for that is that this value
of τ is the one that generates the smaller stable number of
clusters, i.e. cluster with more elements, and that allows
us to evaluate better the beneficial effects that clustering
senders and recipients may have. Moreover, while ana-
lyzing the beta CV we are able to see that the quality of
the clustering for all values τ > 0.4 is approximately the
same.
One of the hypothesis of our algorithm is that we can
group spam messages in terms of the probabilities Ps(m)
and Pr(m). Figure 3 shows the fraction of spam mes-
sages that exist for different values of Ps(m) and Pr(m)
grouped based on a discretization of the full space rep-
resented in the plot. The full space is subdivided into
smaller squares of the same size called bins. Clearly,
spam/legitimate messages are indeed located in the re-
gions (top and bottom respectively) as we have hypoth-
esized in Section 3. There is however a region in the mid-
dle where we can not determine the classification for the
messages based on the computed probabilities. This is
why it becomes necessary to vary ω. One should adjust ω
based on the level of confidence he/she has on the auxil-
iary algorithm.
Figure 3 shows that differentiation between senders and
recipients for detecting spam can be more effective than
the simple choice we use in this paper. Messages ad-
dressed to recipients that have high Pr(m) tend to be
spam more frequently than messages with the same value
of Ps(m). Analogously, messages with low Ps(m) have
higher probability of being legitimate messages. Ways of
using this information in our algorithm are an ongoing re-
search effort that we intend to pursue in future extensions.
Our algorithm makes use of an auxiliary spam detec-
tion algorithm - such as SpamAssassin. Therefore, we
need to evaluate how frequently we maintain the same
classification as such an algorithm. Figure 4 shows the
the percentage of messages that received the same classi-
fication and the total number of classified messages in our
3Beta CV means intra CV/inter CV and assesses the quality of the
clusters generated. The lower the beta CV the better quality in terms of
grouping obtained [15].
simulation by varying ω. The difference between these
curves is the set of messages that were classified differ-
ently from the original classification provided. There is a
clear tradeoff between the total number of messages that
are classifiable and the accordance with the previous clas-
sification provided by the original classifier algorithm.
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Figure 4: Messages Classified in Accordance With to the
Auxiliary Algorithm and the Total Number of Messages
Classified by Varying ω
In another experiment, we simulated a different algo-
rithm that also makes use of history information provided
by an auxiliary spam detector described in [19]. This ap-
proach tries to classify messages based on the historical
properties of their senders. We built a simulator for this
algorithm and executed it against our data set. The results
show that it was able to classify 85.11% of the messages
in accordance with the auxiliary algorithm. Its important
to note that, on the other hand, our algorithm can be tuned
by the proper set of threshold ω. The higher the parameter
ω the more in acordance with the auxiliary classification
the classification of our algorithm is.
We believe that the differences between the original
classification and the classification proposed for high ω
values generally are due to missclassifications by the aux-
iliary algorithm. In our data set we have access to the
full body of the messages that were originally classified
as spam. Therefore, we can evaluate a fraction of the to-
tal amount of false positives (messages that the auxiliary
algorithm classify as spam and our algorithm classify as
legitimate message) that were generated by the auxiliary
algorithm. This is important since there is a common be-
lief that the cost of false positives is higher than the cost
of false negatives [6].
Each of the possible false positives were manually eval-
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uated by three people so as to determine whether such a
message was indeed spam. Table 2 summarizes the re-
sults for ω = 0.85, 879 messages were manually ana-
lyzed (0.24% of the total of messages). Our algorithm
outperforms the original classification since it generates
less false positives. We emphasize that we can not sim-
ilarly determine the quality of classification for the mes-
sages classified as legitimate by the auxiliary algorithm
since we do not have access to the full body of those mes-
sages. Due to the cost of manually classifying messages
we can not aford to classify all of the messages classified
as spam by the auxiliary algorithm.
Algorithm % of Missclassifications
Original Classification 60.33%
Our approach 39.67%
Table 2: Possible False Positives Generated by the Ap-
proaches Studied.
5 Related Work
Previous work have focused on reducing the impact of
spam. The approaches to reduce spam can be categorized
into pre-acceptance and post-acceptance methods, based
on whether they detect and block spam before or after
accepting messages. Examples of pre-acceptance meth-
ods are black lists [14], gray lists [12], server authentica-
tion [7, 3] and accountability [5]. Post-acceptance meth-
ods are mostly based on information available in the body
of the messages and include Bayesian filters [16], collab-
orative filtering [21].
Recent papers have focused on spam combat tech-
niques based on characteristics of graph models of email
traffic [4, 8]. The techniques used try to model email
traffic as a graph and detect spam and spam attacks re-
spectively in terms of graph properties. In [4] a graph is
created representing the email traffic captured in the mail-
box of individual users. The subsequent analysis is based
on the fact that such a network possesses several discon-
nected components. The clustering coefficient of each of
these components is then used to characterize messages
as spam or legitimate. Their results show that 53% of the
messages were precisely classified using the proposed ap-
proach. In [8] the authors used the approach of detecting
machines that behave as spam senders by analyzing a bor-
der flow graph of sender and recipient machines. In[19],
the authors propose a new scheme for handling spam. It
is a post-acceptance mechanism that processes mail sus-
pected of being spam at reduced priority, when compared
to the priority assigned to messages classified as legiti-
mate. The proposed mechanism[19] works in conjunction
with some sort of mail filter that provides past history of
mails received by a server.
None of the existing spam filtering mechanisms are
infallible[19, 6]. Their main problems are false positive
and wrong mail classification. In addition to those prob-
lems, filters must be continuously updated to capture the
multitude of mechanism constantly introduced by spam-
mers to avoid filtering actions. The algorithm presented
in this paper aims at improving the effectiveness of spam
filtering mechanisms, by reducing false positives and by
providing information that help those mechanism to tune
their collection of rules.
6 Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper we proposed a new spam detection algorithm
based on the structural similarity between contact lists of
email users. The idea is that contact lists, integrated over a
suitable amount of time, are much more stable identifiers
of email users than id names, domains or message con-
tents, which can all be made to vary quickly and widely.
The major drawback of our approach is that our algorithm
can only group users based on their structural similarity,
but has no way of determining by itself if such vector clus-
ters correspond to spam or legitimate email. Because of
this feature it must work in tandem with an original clas-
sifier. Given this information we have shown that we can
successfully group spam and legitimate email users sep-
arately and that this structural inference can improve the
quality of other spam detection algorithms.
Specifically we have implemented a simulator based
on data collected from the main SMTP server for a ma-
jor university in Brazil that uses SpamAssassin. We have
shown that our algorithm can be tuned to produce classifi-
cations similar to those of the original classifier algorithm
and that, for a certain set of parameters, is was capable of
correcting false positives generated by SpamAssassin in
our workload.
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There are several improvements and developments that
were not explored here, but promise to reinforce the
strength of our approach. We intend to explore these in fu-
ture work. We observe that structural similarity gives us a
basis for time correlation of similar addresses, and as such
to follow the time evolution of spam sender techniques, in
ways that suitably factor out the enormous variability of
their apparent identifiers. Finally we note that the proba-
bilistic basis of our approach lends itself naturally to the
evolution of users’ classifications (say through Bayesian
inference), both through collaborative filtering using user
feedback and from information derived from other algo-
rithmic classifiers.
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